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Abstract
It has been widely documented that investment in infrastructure is
important for economic growth, but little work has been done in relation
to the impact of infrastructure investment among other macroeconomic
variables. This paper develops a Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium
(DSGE) model of a small open economy to study the eﬀects of public
investment in infrastructure on output, consumption, private investment,
trade balance and welfare. The model is parameterized and solved for ﬁve
representative countries from The Initiative for the Integration of Regional
Infrastructure in South America (IIRSA), which include: Bolivia, Chile,
Brazil, Venezuela and Argentina. I also analyze the growth eﬀects on
GDP by increasing or decreasing the eﬀectiveness index of infrastructure
in each of these countries. Naturally output will grow at a larger rate, if
infrastructure is handled with greater eﬃciency.
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11I n t r o d u c t i o n
Although infrastructure was incorporated in the theory of growth literature by
Arrow and Kurz (1970) and Weitzman (1970), people began to study the theme
seriously after the seminal work of Barro (1990). Barro’s model is well known,
because he introduces government spending as a variable in the production
function. The existence of constant returns to capital and government spending
imply that the economy is capable of endogenous growth.
Coinciding with this new birth of the growth literature, empirical literature
related to infrastructure is also showing up. Infrastructure becomes an impor-
tant source of growth as shown by Aschauer (1989a) and Aschauer (1989b).
These works concentrated in estimating production elasticities of government
expenditure, using aggregated data for countries, mainly the U.S. There are also
cross-country studies that emphasize the role of infrastructure for a country’s
growth.
Papers concerning this subject have typically used regressions analysis on
either “growth accounting” or steady state equations. While these papers have
been useful in pointing out the importance of infrastructure, their methodology
does not allow for the analysis of important general equilibrium feedback eﬀects
among key macroeconomic variables and welfare.
This paper examines infrastructure as a platform for productive transfor-
mation in Latin America, using a Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium
(DSGE) model for 5 Latin American countries. This type of new generation
model will allow us to analyze the macroeconomic and welfare impact of public
infrastructure. First, I analyze the macroeconomic impact of increasing public
infrastructure investment as a share of GDP on output, consumption, private
investment and trade balance. Second, I compute the welfare gains associated
with an increase of infrastructure investment as a share of GDP. And ﬁnally
I inspect how the GDP rate of growth of each country changes when the in-
frastructure eﬀectiveness index varies. An important point is that the model is
capable to yield accurate quantitative predictions that can be used for policy
analysis.
I circumscribe the analysis to 5 Latin American countries that belong to
the Initiative for the Integration of Regional Infrastructure in South America
(IIRSA). The chosen countries are: Bolivia, Chile, Brazil, Venezuela and Ar-
gentina. These countries are representative for the integration and development
hubs identiﬁed by the IIRSA. The case of Bolivia will be examined for three
reasons. First, it has a strategic location in South America; second, it belongs
to ﬁve hubs (Andean, Southern Andean, Paraguay-Paraná Waterway, Central
Interoceanic and Peru-Brazil-Bolivia); and third, it is a country with very low
levels of infrastructure. The case of Chile will be examined because it has
demonstrated excellent economic performance in recent years. Brazil represents
the biggest and most important country in South America. Finally, Argentina
and Venezuela represent the two extremes of the IIRSA: Venezuela in the north
taking part in the Andean and the Guianese Shield hubs, and Argentina in
the south taking part in the Southern Andean, Capricorn, Southern, Paraguay-
2Paraná and Mercosur-Chile hubs. Furthermore, Venezuela and Argentina have
had the highest growth rates in 2006, with 10.5% and 8.8% respectively.1
Results show that the macroeconomic and welfare eﬀects of an increase in
public infrastructure investment as a share of GDP depend directly on the ac-
tual share of public investment in infrastructure. Countries with higher shares
of public investment will enjoy higher welfare gains and higher rates of GDP
growth.I am using diﬀerent values for the two key parameters of the model,
which are the eﬀectiveness parameter and the share of public capital in the pro-
duction function. Concretely, I calibrate diﬀerent values for these parameters
for each country, since my aim is to make comparisons between countries.2
Countries like Bolivia and Chile would be able to grow at rates higher than
6 percent only by raising their investment in public infrastructure by only 2
percent more. Argentina and Venezuela are the countries that assign a lower
proportion of their GDP to public investment in infrastructure, which translates
to smaller potential of reaching important rates of growth and welfare gains.
Venezuela needs to invest 6 percent of its GDP in public infrastructure to grow
at 5.75 percent.
Using the model I developed, we ﬁnd that public infrastructure investment
leads to a substitution and an income eﬀect. These eﬀects are visible over
welfare, consumption, private investment and wages. The substitution eﬀect
appears because the new public infrastructure is ﬁnanced by an income tax and
this aﬀects negatively the marginal product of labor, while the income eﬀect ap-
pears because a larger stock of public infrastructure aﬀects positively the mar-
ginal product of labor. If the ﬁrst eﬀect dominates the second eﬀect, we should
expect ﬁrst, a reduction in wages. This reduction in wages aﬀects consumption
directly and therefore welfare, which is measured in terms of consumption.
There can be also a reduction in private investment which as Rioja (2001),
I call a crowding out eﬀect. Although, this crowding out eﬀect emerges for very
large shares of public infrastructure investment, except for Venezuela, where it
emerges when the country invests 6 percent of GDP inpublic infrastructure, they
have to be considered while making policy decisions, since they restrict private
investment. It shows that in most cases it is better to have an investment in
public infrastructure of 4 percent of GDP rather than a 6 percent since private
investment continues to grow, but it does so at a decreasing rate. For instance
Brazil has a change in private investment (as a share of GDP) of 4.05 percent
at 4 percent increase in infrastructure investment, while it has a change of only
3.16 percent when infrastructure investment increases by 6 percent of GDP.3
The varying results in terms of magnitudes and eﬀe c t s ,m a d em ep e r f o r m
some policy experiments with the two key parameters, which are the eﬀective-
ness and public capital share parameters. Both parameters are related one
to each other. I ﬁnd that the results of changing the eﬀectiveness of pub-
lic infrastructure depend strongly on the actual levels of eﬃciency. Countries
1The model can be easily applied to any other Latin American country.
2Rioja (2001) and Rioja (2003) ﬁnd the opposite: countries with lower stocks of public
capital will enjoy higher growth and welfare gains.
3The crowding out eﬀect was ﬁrst discovered econometrically by Aschauer (1989c).
3like, Bolivia which are ineﬃcient in terms of infrastructure management could
reach important rates of GDP growth just by increasing public investment in
infrastructure by 1 percent, if eﬃciency could improve up to or close to the in-
dustrialized countries levels. Here, I have calibrated these parameters for each
country. In the literature, there is no consensus about which is the exact value
that these parameters should have, nevertheless, the results obtained with the
model developed here, are consistent and feasible.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the dynamic stochastic
general equilibrium model used. Section 3 calibrates the model for each of the
ﬁve countries selected. Section 4 reports the log-run macroeconomic and welfare
eﬀects, as well as the policy experiments with the key parameters of the model.
Finally, Section 5 presents the conclusions.
2 The Model
In this section I develop a simple dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE)
model of public infrastructure investment. It is a two-sector DSGE model of a
small open economy. The model is based on Rioja (2001), but modiﬁed to be
stochastic. This modiﬁcation is signiﬁcant as it allows for analysis and at the
same time for growth and business cycles of the economy.
The model belongs to the neoclassical tradition. These RBC models are sim-
pler since they do not incorporate imperfect competition and/or sticky prices as
New-Keynesian models do. Furthermore, as I am not going to deal with mone-
tary issues and my main goal is to develop quantitative implications in a simple
framework, important factors are not lost by not using the more elaborated
New-Keynesian models.
2.1 Households
There is an inﬁnitely-lived representative household living in a single-good, sto-






where β ∈ (0,1), ct ≥ 0 and lt ≥ 0 denote consumption and leisure at time t
respectively; u(·) is an instantaneous felicity function, strictly concave and twice
continuously diﬀerentiable.
With one unit of time per period, households divide it between leisure lt and
labor nt.
1=lt + nt (2)
The household’s budget constraint is given by:
ct + it + qtbt+1 ≤ wtnt + Rtkt + bt (3)
4The same as assuming that there is a large number of inﬁnitely-lived households.
4Households supply labor and earn wages (wt). They own physical capital
(kt), from which they earn a return (Rt) by renting it to ﬁrms. They earn also,
a return on their net holdings of foreign bonds (bt), which they can buy and
sell at the world interest rate Rt.5 As they own the capital, they spend on
investment (it). They consume (ct) and purchase foreign bonds at a price qt.
The bond is a risk-free bond that delivers one unit of consumption next period.
Typically, private capital evolves according to,
kt+1 = it +( 1− δk)kt (4)
where δk is the depreciation rate of capital.
As always, we have to impose a transversality condition or no-Ponzi game




(1 + R)t =0
This condition prevents households to borrow forever.
2.2 Firms
The representative ﬁrm uses three factors of production to produce the ﬁnal
good. The production function is given by:
yt = Atf(G∗
t,k t,n t) (5)
where G∗
t is the eﬀective aggregate stock of public infrastructure (or public
capital), kt is private capital, nt is labor and At is a technological shock, which
I will assume follows an AR(1) process.
The eﬀective public stock of infrastructure is provided publicly. I assume
that private agents cannot provide this input, because it can be hard to exclude
free-riders or to charge users a competitive price.6 This eﬀective stock is related
to a raw stock of infrastructure Gt according to:
G∗
t = θGt (6)
where θ ∈ (0,1) is a measure of eﬀectiveness. Raw infrastructure evolves
according to the following equation:
Gt+1 = It +( 1− δg)Gt (7)
where It is the amount invested in public infrastructure and δg is its depre-
ciation rate.
In each period, the representative ﬁrm takes Rt and wt as given and rents
capital and labor from households to maximize net-of-tax proﬁts
max
{kt,nt}
(1 − λt)yt − Rtkt − wtnt (8)
where λt is the tax rate on output.
5As we are assuming that this is a small open economy, the interest rate Rt is given.
6Rioja (2001) uses the same assumption.
52.3 Government
The government only invests in public infrastructure It and ﬁnances this invest-
ment stream by taxing output. So, the government’s budget constraint is given
by:
It = λtyt (9)
Notice that λt can be interpreted also as the investment in public infrastruc-
ture share of GDP.
2.4 Foreign Sector
Finally, there is a foreign sector where the trade balance is the diﬀerence between
output (yt) and domestic absorption (ct+it+It).7 The trade balance in period
t (TBt) is given by the evolution of the net holdings of foreign bonds.
TBt = qtbt+1 − bt (10)
Equation (10) represents also the Balance of Payments of the country. To
close the model it is necessary to also include a law of movement for bonds. I
assume that bonds follow an AR(1) process. With this assumption there is no
need to model the foreign sector in deep. Furthermore, as public infrastructure
is totally ﬁnanced by taxes, public infrastructure investment should not have
any eﬀects on the trade balance.
2.5 Market-Clearing Condition
The goods market-clearing condition is given by
ct + it + It + TBt = yt (11)
which states that the supply and demand must be equal.
2.6 Stochastic Competitive General Equilibrium
A Stochastic Competitive General Equilibrium (SCGE) for this economy is a set
of allocation rules for ct(x), lt(x), nt(x), it(x), kt+1(x), It(x), TBt(x), yt(x),
and Gt(x), contingent prices Rt(x), wt(x) and qt(x),n u m b e r sλt and θt,a n d
law of motions of the exogenous state variables x = At,b t such that:
i) Given k0 > 0, Rt(x), wt(x), qt(x) and x, the contingent plans for ct(x),
lt(x), nt(x), it(x), kt+1(x) solve the households’ optimization problem.
ii) For each history of x in each period t,g i v e nRt(x) and wt(x),t h ec o n t i n -
gent plans for nt(x), kt+1(x), yt(x),a n dGt(x),s o l v et h eﬁrms’ optimiza-
tion problem.
7Notice that, here, absorption includes investment in public capital (infrastructure) as well
as investment in private capital.
6iii) In each period t,t h eg o v e r n m e n ts a t i s ﬁes its budget constraint given by
equation (9).
iv) In each period t, markets clear, i.e. equation (11) holds.
3 Functional Forms and Calibration
The model just described is diﬃcult to solve analytically. The alternative is to
use numerical methods. Therefore, I will adopt functional forms for the utility
and productions functions and give values to the parameters of the model to
match exactly real data of each of the ﬁve countries. Bearing in mind that I will
calibrate the model for Bolivia, Argentina, Brazil, Chile and Venezuela, one has
to be very rigorous at this stage to simulate exactly these economies. Failure
to exactly match the National Account ratios and standard deviations of key
variables from these economies will result in the extraction of inadequate results
and in the diﬃculty of giving precise policy implications.8











The production function is assumed to be of the Cobb-Douglas type, includ-







Notice that the coeﬃcient of public capital φ is a function of θ,t h ee ﬀective-
ness parameter, as in Hulten (1996). The reason for these relation is that new
public investment is more productive the higher the degree of eﬀectiveness in
the economy. If φ did not depend on θ, an increase in public investment would
h a v et h es a m ei m p a c tw h e t h e re ﬀectiveness was low or high.
The exogenous shocks At and bt, follow AR(1) processes given by:
ln(At+1)=A0 + ρA ln(At)+σAεA
t+1
ln(bt+1)=ξ1 + ρb ln(bt)+σbεb
t+1
For the parameterizations, three parameters have been assumed constant
and the same for the ﬁve countries. Those parameters are the utility curvature
parameter σ, the depreciation rate of private capital δk and the depreciation
rate of public capital δg. I assign a value of 2 to σ, which is a number consistent
with the macro literature. The depreciation rate of private capital δk is set
to a standard value of 10 percent per year or equivalently a 2.41 percent per
quarter. According to the World Bank (World Development Report 1994), the
8Most authors avoid this stage.
7depreciation rate of public capital δg has been estimated to be twice of the
depreciation rate of private capital.
As my aim is to make comparisons between countries, I have computed the
infrastructure eﬀectiveness parameter θ for each country using the so called
"Loss Indicators" of the World Bank. Table A1 in the appendix shows the
calculations for each country, using the loss indicators for power, telecommuni-
cations, paved roads and water. Most of these loss indicators have been taken
from the World Development Report 1994 which correspond to the year 1990.
For Argentina and Brazil these indicators have been actualized using the data
of Fay and Morrison (2005). The missing values have been completed using
averages from 1990, in particular for the water provision. A country loss index
across infrastructure types is calculated by taking a weighted loss for each coun-
try in the study and comparing it with the weighted average of industrialized
countries.9
The weighted loss for Brazil is 21.15 percent which represents an infrastruc-
ture eﬀectiveness of 78.85 percent, while the weighted average loss in industri-
alized countries is 10 percent, this means that they are 90 percent eﬀective.
Suppose the eﬀectiveness index θ is normalized to 1 for industrial countries: in-
frastructure is highly eﬀective. Then this implies that θ for Brazil is about 87.66
percent (=0.7885/0.9). This rationale is applied for each country to compute
the values of θ shown in table 1.
Next, the infrastructure share parameter φ must be related to θ.Ia s s u m e
also that this relation should be diﬀerent for each country, as diﬀerent combi-
nations of private capital, public capital and labor will conﬁgure the output.
Unfortunately there are no country-speciﬁc regressions that estimate this para-
meter, so I have calibrated it using as benchmark, the computations performed
by Rioja (2003). Considering the value of θ ﬁxed, I look for the value of φ
that increases GDP in the long run by 3.74 percent, when public investment
in infrastructure is increased by 1 percent. The value of 3.74 percent is the
average value found by Rioja (2003) for Latin American countries. Notice that,
the values for φ range from 0.01457, the lowest value for Venezuela, to 0.0923,
the highest value for Bolivia. The correlation between θ and φ is linear within
a country, but not between countries. This means that, within a country a
higher degree of eﬀectiveness is associated with a larger value of public capital
share. But, a country with a higher value of θ than another country would not
have necessarily a higher value of φ than the other country. For example, Brazil
which has the highest level of eﬀectiveness, has a lower value of public capital
share than Bolivia, which is the least eﬃcient country.
I assume that the ﬁve countries are small open economies, so they take the
international real interest rate as given. Using monthly data for the Libor rate,
I obtain an average rate of 1 percent per quarter. This parameter choice for the
interest rate implies that the discount rate, β, equals 0.99.
9I use the same weights as in Rioja (2003), this means 0.40, 0.10, 0.25, 0.25 for the Latin
American countries and 0.50, 0.09, 0.30, 0.11 for industrialized countries, for power, telecom,
paved roads and water systems respectively.
8Table 1: Calibrated Parameters
Parameter Countries’ Parameter Values
Argentina Bolivia Brazil Chile Venezuela
σ 22 2 22
θ 0.8066 0.6865 0.8766 0.7793 0.7749
φ 0.02455 0.0923 0.0442 0.0564 0.01457
λ 0.0046 0.028 0.0114 0.0157 0.0013
α 0.2731 0.19 0.2674 0.2741 0.2398
δk 0.0241 0.0241 0.0241 0.0241 0.0241
δg 0.0482 0.0482 0.0482 0.0482 0.0482
γ 0.49 0.64 0.59 0.55 0.62
β 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99
A0 0.001075 -0.000154 0.007761 0.349 0.1054
ξ1 0.194 0.1095 0.1592 -0.8989 -3.836
ρA 0.908405 0.30509 0.951991 0.395411 0.677768
ρb 0.580059 0.645147 0.812591 0.464554 0.089395
σA 0.01871 0.011228 0.150859 0.016599 0.03907
σb 0.126363 0.097912 0.120855 0.085431 0.310509
The value of the private capital share in the production function, α,h a s
been calibrated for each country. Argentina, Chile and Brazil have values for
α closer to 0.27, which is a reasonable value, since for developed countries this
value is closer to 0.3. Venezuela and Bolivia have lower values, in particular it
calls the attention the lower value for Bolivia which is 0.19. This is explained
by the lower rate of investment that this country has had in the last years. The
rate of investment in Bolivia has been12 percent on average. These values are
consistent with other neoclassical general equilibrium models, done for each of
the selected countries.10
The consumption share γ has been calibrated to match the Global Partic-
ipation Rate (GPR) for each country.11 This parameter diﬀers from the value
used by Rioja (2001) and Rioja (2003) where he considered a ﬁxed value of 0.35.
Here, this parameter has a value between 0.49 and 0.64.
The parameters that correspond to the exogenous shocks A and b have been
estimated with the corresponding Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regressions.
Some slope coeﬃcients have been modiﬁe db a s e do nt h er e g r e s s i o nr e s u l t s ,t o
calibrate the trade balance for each country. In all cases I used quarterly data
for the GDP and external debt for each country. The series for external debt
correspond to multilateral debt and have been extracted from the Bank of Inter-
national Settlements. The series have been seasonally smoothed using the X12
method and the slope has been extracted using the Hodrick-Prescott ﬁlter.12
10See Quiroz, Bernasconi, Chumacero and Revoredo (1991) for Bolivia, Kehoe (2003) for
Argentina, Bugarin, de Goes Ellery Jr., Silva and Muinhos (2005) for Brazil, Medina and Soto
(2005) for Chile, and Hausmann (2001) for Venezuela.
11The Global Participation Rate is deﬁned as the ratio between the economic active popu-
lation and the population in age of work.
12The law of movement of bonds has been estimated in logarithms only for Brazil, Bolivia
9Finally the value of λ has been computed using the World Bank Data Base
of Investment in Infrastructure. This Data Base has yearly data of public and
private investment in infrastructure for 9 Latin American countries, including
the ones considered here in this study. The investment in infrastructure is
divided by sectors, including roads, railways, electricity, gas, water and telecom
and the values have been collected from diﬀerent works done in each country.
Nevertheless, the only problem with these data is that it covers the period 1980-
1998. I tried to complete the series with more up-to-date values, but I found
only isolated values. I have been able to complete the data only until the year
2001, using the paper of Calderón and Servén (2004). So, the National Account
ratios that I used correspond to the average for the last ten years (1990-2001).
These ratios are shown in table 2.










n c/y i/y I/y TB/y
Argentina Data 0.4592 0.8188 0.1930 0.0046 -0.0164
Model 0.45911 0.81902 0.19299 0.0046 -0.016608
Bolivia Data 0.62 0.8574 0.1311 0.0280 -0.0166
Model 0.62016 0.85727 0.13111 0.0280 -0.016382
Brazil Data 0.561 0.817 0.1877 0.0114 -0.0162
Model 0.56039 0.81759 0.18767 0.0114 -0.01666
Chile Data 0.5383 0.7579 0.1915 0,0157 0,0349
Model 0.53548 0.75756 0.19153 0.0157 0.035204
Venezuela Data 0.656 0.666 0.17 0.0013 0.1627
Model 0.65081 0.66463 0,17002 0.0013 0.16406
Note: GPR=Global Participation Rate
Naturally, I/y corresponds to the value of λ and it is exactly the same as in
the data since it is a value extracted directly from there.13 The data value of
n, which is the Global Participation Rate, corresponds to 2005 values extracted
from the "Compas Laboral", Interamerican Development Bank. In the next
section I report the long-run eﬀects of increasing this value.
4 Long-run and Welfare Eﬀects
4.1 Long-run Eﬀects
This section analyses the long-run macroeconomic and welfare eﬀects of in-
creasing public infrastructure investment in each of the ﬁve countries. In par-
ticular, I analyze the eﬀects on GDP, consumption, private capital investment,
trade balance, labor and wages. These eﬀects are also analyzed using time
and Chile, because they report a deﬁcit in trade balance. For Venezuela and Chile we needed
negative values, so logarithms cannot be used.
13These values are also very similar to the ones used by Calderón and Servén (2004).
10series calculated with the second order approximation technique proposed by
Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2004b), but since the time series calculations showed
negligible diﬀerences to those of the steady-state values, I will present all of the
results using the steady-state values. The fact that the second-order approxi-
mation results do not diﬀer from the steady-state results means that volatilities
or second order eﬀects do not play an important role in explaining the eﬀects
of infrastructure investment.14
T h ef o l l o w i n gt a b l es h o w st h ee ﬀects of a 2, 4 and 6 percent increase of pub-
lic infrastructure investment on the aforementioned macroeconomic variables.
These percentage changes are changes of public infrastructure investment as a
share of GDP and are within a feasible and observable range.
Table 3: Macroeconomic Eﬀects of Public Infrastructure Investment
(percent change)
∆λ ∆y ∆c ∆i ∆tb ∆labor ∆wage
Argentina
2% 5.24 3.06 3.12 0 0.0332 3.09
4% 6.58 2.25 2.30 0 0.0246 2.27
6% 7.06 0.60 0.61 0 0.0066 0.60
Bolivia
2% 6.63 4.35 4.43 0 0.0308 4.40
4% 10.9 6.22 6.34 0 0.0433 6.29
6% 13.99 6.82 6.95 0 0.0472 6.90
Brazil
2% 5.91 3.69 3.77 0 0.0326 3.74
4% 8.44 3.97 4.05 0 0.0349 4.02
6% 9.83 3.10 3.16 0 0.0275 3.14
Chile
2% 6.17 4.20 4.02 0 -0.0833 4.10
4% 9.27 5.05 4.83 0 -0.0993 4.93
6% 11.16 4.59 4.38 0 -0.0906 4.48
Venezuela
2% 4.70 3.24 2.60 0 -0.2181 2.83
4% 5.48 1.56 1.25 0 -0.1067 1.36
6% 5.75 -0.75 -0.60 0 0.0524 -0.66
First, it can be seen that by increasing public infrastructure investment by
2 percent, the impact on GDP growth is in the range between 4.7 percent and
6.63 percent. Bolivia and Chile, which are the countries with the largest public
infrastructure investment shares, are able to reach GDP rates of growth larger
than 6 percent. This result contrasts with previous literature, where it is found
that the countries with the lowest rates of investment in public infrastructure
are the ones that reach larger rates of GDP growth.
14The second-order approximation results are available upon request from the author.
11In Venezuela, where investment in infrastructure is only 0.13 percent of
GDP, 2 and 6 percent increases in public infrastructure investment as a share
of GDP can increase GDP by 4.7 percent and up to 5.75 percent. Consider
then, the opposite case of Bolivia, which has 2.8 percent of GDP invested in
public infrastructure. There, the growth gain of increasing public infrastructure
investment by 2 and 6 percent can increase GDP between 6.63 percent and up
to almost 14 percent
If we think on this issue as an elasticity, an elasticity of growth with public
infrastructure investment, I can aﬃrm that this elasticity is larger than one in
all cases and turns out even larger when a country has already an important
stock of public capital. So, countries that are not investing too much in public
capital will ﬁnd it diﬃcult to reach higher rates of output growth, since the
marginal increases of output growth are inferior.
It is also noticeable in the table that the rate of output growth is always
an increasing function of public infrastructure investment (for these rates of
growth of public infrastructure investment). But, consumption, private capital
investment, labor and wages present rates of growth that increase until some
point and then begin to decrease. This issue depends strongly on the initial stock
of public capital. For example, all the variables have an increasing rate of growth
for Bolivia, but a decreasing rate for Argentina and Venezuela. Furthermore,
in the case of Venezuela, when public infrastructure investment is raised by 6
percent, consumption, private investment and wages report a negative rate of
change.
This fact means that public investment in infrastructure as a share of GDP
(represented by λ)h a st w oe ﬀects. Let’s call them an income eﬀect and a
substitution eﬀect. These eﬀects aﬀect the marginal products of capital and
labor, given by rt =( 1− λ)αyt/kt and wt =( 1− λ)(1 − α)yt/nt respectively.15
Recall that the new infrastructure is ﬁnanced by an income tax represented also
by λ. So, an increase in λ decreases the wage rate. This is the substitution
eﬀect. Notice that this increase in λ cannot aﬀect the net-of-tax rate of return
r. This fact implies that, ceteris paribus, inputs need to adjust to keep the
marginal product of capital equal to r.
The second eﬀect -income eﬀect- works in opposite direction, as λ increases,
the raw stock of public capital Gt increases (see equation 7) and by equation
6t h ee ﬀective aggregate stock of public infrastructure G∗
t also increases. So
the marginal product of labor increases and the wage rate also increases. Of
course this income eﬀect tends to increase also the marginal product of capital.
Again inputs need to adjust to maintain r ﬁxed. In sum, the substitution eﬀect
and income eﬀect oﬀset each other, keeping the net-of-tax marginal product of
capital constant at r.
The results shown in table 3 are reinforced by the graphs shown in the ap-
pendix, where it becomes clear that after some threshold point the substitution
eﬀect dominates the income eﬀect. In the graphs, it can be seen that raising
λ has at ﬁrst a positive eﬀect, which later diminishes and eventually becomes
15Rioja (2001) calls this eﬀe c t st h er e s o u r c ec o s ta n dt h er e s o u r c eb e n e ﬁt.
12negative. This inverse U eﬀect is valid for private investment, consumption and
wage. Furthermore, the magnitude of change in these three variables is similar.
Notice also that the maximum point of this inverse U is closer to 0 in the
horizontal axis for countries with lower infrastructure investment as a share
of GDP, as in Argentina and Venezuela. This means that the substitution
eﬀect tends to be stronger in countries with lower stocks of public capital. In
other words, countries with lower levels of infrastructure investment as a share
of GDP are more sensitive to income taxes, used to ﬁnance the new public
infrastructure.16
Table 3 also shows that public investment in infrastructure has no eﬀect on
the trade balance and a negligible eﬀect on labor. The latter result is corrobo-
rated by the graphs in the appendix, from which it is clearly seen that public
infrastructure investment does not aﬀect labor supply. The fact that private in-
vestment decreases as public investment increases means that public investment
can generate a crowding out eﬀect. Nevertheless this crowding out eﬀect only
appears at a certain point and it can be interpreted as a point that restricts
public investment. In other words a government that does not want to reduce
the rate of growth of private investment as a share of GDP can invest in public
infrastructure only until that point.
The results found in this section imply a marked policy implication. A
government will be restricted in its public infrastructure investment decisions
by the private investment share of GDP. Actually, it is also restricted at the
same time by consumption and wages, because these variables also present the
Ui n v e r s ee ﬀect. This constraint represents a ﬁnancing constraint. Countries
with lower levels of public infrastructure investment or public capital stock will
be constrained by the fact that trying to ﬁnance larger levels of public investment
will result in a depression of consumption and private capital investment.
4.2 Welfare Eﬀects
The welfare gains associated with an increase in infrastructure investment are
computed as in Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2004a). I measure welfare as the
conditional expectation of lifetime utility as of time zero, that is,













t are the contingent plans for consumption and leisure, respectively.
I compute the welfare cost/gain of an increase in public infrastructure in-
vestment relative to the optimized rule as follows: Consider two infrastructure
regimes, a reference infrastructure regime denoted by r a n da na l t e r n a t i v ei n -
frastructure regime denoted by a. This alternative regime will be of course,
the regime with a higher level of public infrastructure. So, I deﬁne two welfare
m e a s u r e sa s s o c i a t e dw i t hb o t hr e g imes using equation (12), where j = r,a.
16Notice also that output growth shows this inverse U eﬀect, but for larger and unfeasible
rates of change of λ.
13Let µ denote the welfare cost/gain of adopting the optimal regime a instead
of the reference policy regime r.I m e a s u r e µ as the fraction of regime r’s
consumption process that a household would be willing to give up to be as well









For the particular functional form for the period utility function, the welfare
cost/gain is computed using the following formula:
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In table 4, I report the welfare cost/gain for the ﬁve economies.17 The results
are very similar to those found in the previous section related to macroeconomic
eﬀects. In particular, the welfare gains stream is similar in magnitude and in
form to the streams of consumption, private investment and wage, as can be
seen clearly in the appendix. This inverse U pattern implies that there is one
maximum level of welfare that can be reached with a speciﬁc level of public
infrastructure investment. The last column of table 4, reports this value for
each country.
Table 4: Welfare Eﬀects of Raising Infrastructure Investment
∆λ 2% 4% 6% Maximum Level
Argentina ∆w -3.03 -2.23 -0.59 -3.03 (∆λ =2 .46%)
Bolivia ∆w -4.32 -6.17 -6.77 -6.8 (∆λ =9 .2%)
Brazil ∆w -3.66 -3.94 -3.08 -4.02 (∆λ =4 .44%)
Chile ∆w -4.28 -5.15 -4.68 -5.15 (∆λ =5 .67%)
Venezuela ∆w -3.50 -1.69 0.81 -3.70 (∆λ =1 .43%)
It seems that welfare gains as output gains are also associated with the
initial level of public infrastructure investment. Countries with lower stocks of
public capital experience lower welfare gains and countries with larger stocks
experience larger welfare gains. An exception to this “rule” is Venezuela when
it invests 2 percent of GDP in public infrastructure. Although this country has
a lower stock of public capital than Argentina, it experiences a welfare gain of
3.5 percent, while Argentina experiences a gain of only 3.03 percent.
The maximum levels of welfare diﬀer for each country. Naturally, Bolivia
and Chile are the countries that can reach the highest levels of welfare, al-
though they need larger levels of infrastructure investment as a share of GDP.
Argentina and Venezuela can reach a maximum welfare gain of 3 percent and
3.7 percent respectively, and they need to raise their levels of public investment
in infrastructure by 2.46 percent and 1.43 percent respectively. These maximum
levels also depend on the initial, stock of public capital, except for Venezuela.
17The minus sign of all the values represent a negative cost, or in another words a gain.
144.3 Signiﬁcance of Eﬀectiveness
In general, the results of any General Equilibrium model depend on the parame-
ters used: so, precise and accurate parameter values are needed to give accurate
policy implications. The key parameters of the model used in the paper are the
eﬀectiveness parameter θ and the public capital share in the production function
parameter φ. This subsection analyzes the eﬀects of increasing and decreasing
the eﬀectiveness of public capital on GDP, when infrastructure investment in-
creases by 1 percent. Rioja (2003) makes a similar exercise, under the rationale
that new public investment is more productive the higher the degree of eﬀec-
tiveness in the whole system. I make the same exercise, but assuming that for
each value of θ, the associated values of φ diﬀer for each country.
Many papers have been written to estimate the share of public infrastructure
parameter φ, also known as the elasticity of infrastructure (see Zugasti (2001)).
Using diﬀerent econometric techniques, diﬀerent values have been estimated for
this parameter. This many diﬀerent results do not allow me to be conﬁdent
about the values used in the parameterizations. It would be better to have
country regressions. Nevertheless, the results obtained are in concordance with
reality, since they reﬂect reasonable rates of GDP growth. Consider that in
the last years, Latin America’s rate of growth has been on average around 4
percent, a rate lower than in Asia (around 7 percent) and even lower than in
Africa (around 5 percent).18
Table 5 shows the net eﬀects of raising public investment by 1% of GDP
(i.e., raising λ by 1 percent) under diﬀerent degrees of eﬀectiveness. I change
the infrastructure eﬀectiveness index θ from 0.2 to 1. Recall that the closer θ is
to 1, the more eﬀective the public capital stock and the larger the beneﬁtt h a t
ﬁrms get. For all the countries considered in the study, it can be seen that as
public capital turns out more eﬀective, the growth gains are larger.
Table 5: Long-Run Eﬀects of changing the eﬀectiveness parameter θ
Eﬀect. Index Argentina Bolivia Brazil Chile Venezuela
θ %∆Y %∆Y %∆Y %∆Y %∆Y
0.2 0.58 0.80 0.49 0.59 0.84
0.3 1.07 1.34 0.94 1.15 1.38
0.4 1.57 1.95 1.40 1.65 1.92
0.5 2.08 2.53 1.87 2.16 2.20
0.6 2.59 3.19 2.34 2.69 2.75
0.7 3.12 3.83 2.83 3.31 3.30
0.8 3.64 4.55 3.32 3.87 3.86
0.9 4.18 5.24 3.82 4.44 4.42
1 4.73 5.97 4.34 5.03 5.00
Imagine that our ﬁve Latin American countries would be able to reach in-
dustrial countries in the degree of eﬀectiveness (θ =1 ). Bolivia’s GDP could
increase by 6 percent, Argentina’s GDP could increase by 4.73 percent, Chile
18See Velasco (2005).
15and Venezuela’s GDP could increase by 5 percent and ﬁnally Brazil’s GDP could
increase by 4.34 percent. Recall that Brazil is the country with the highest in-
dex of eﬀectiveness, while Bolivia is the country with the lowest index. So, I
can assert that countries that are not eﬃcient in using their infrastructure could
attain higher rates of GDP growth by raising their eﬀectiveness than countries
that are already using their infrastructure in a more eﬃcient way.
On average, infrastructure in these ﬁv ec o u n t r i e si s6 5p e r c e n te ﬀective.
By the results on table 3, we can see that on average these countries’ GDP
would grow 3 percent if public infrastructure investment rises by 1 percent. If
eﬀectiveness was lower, say θ =0 .3, increasing investment by 1 percent of GDP
would raise GDP by only around 1 percent also.
Not shown in the table are the diﬀerent values of φ associated with the
values of θ. These values are country-speciﬁc and range from 0 to 0.14. Various
authors have estimated thee l a s t i c i t yo fi n f r a s t r u c t u r ef o ras a m p l eo fm a n y
countries. Among these authors I can mention Barro (1990) who estimated a
value of 0.13 for a sample of 118 countries for the period 1960-1985, Easterly
and Rebelo (1993) who estimated a value of 0.16 for a sample of developed
countries, Nourzad and Vrieze (1995) who estimated a range of values between
0.045 and 0.055 for a sample of OECD countries for the period 1963-1988 and
Calderón and Servén (2002) who estimated a value of 0.16 for a large panel data
set of 101 industrial and developing countries. In sum, the values used in the
parameterizations agree with the values estimated by the empirical literature.
Three conclusions can be extracted from this policy experiments. First,
there is a positive relation between eﬃciency and growth. As countries turn
out more eﬃcient (i.e. maintain their roads, provide services with high quality,
reduce corruption, etc.) the impact over GDP of a raise in public infrastructure
investment is larger. Second, the GDP eﬀect depends on the actual level of
eﬀectiveness. The marginal increase in the GDP rate of growth is larger when a
country has a lower index of eﬀectiveness. Third, good individual estimates for
the parameters θ and φ and its correlations are needed. The use of calibrated
values for each country gives us some insights, though.
5C o n c l u s i o n s
This paper presents a general equilibrium model used to quantify the long-
run macroeconomic and welfare eﬀects of an increase in public infrastructure
investment as a percentage of GDP. The model is dynamic, stochastic, and
internally consistent, which means that it has been accurately calibrated for
each of the ﬁve Latin American countries selected for the study. Jemio (2006)
stresses the importance of using general equilibrium models to analyze the im-
pact of infrastructure and this paper contributes to this branch of the literature
by presenting a simple model of a small open economy that through a tough
methodology answers the question: Which proportion of GDP should a country
invest in infrastructure to attain a productive transformation.?
One of the principal ﬁndings of this paper is that the magnitude of the
16eﬀects of raising public infrastructure investment depends strongly on the actual
conditions of public infrastructure. Countries that currently have a larger share
of GDP’s infrastructure investment will experience larger rates of GDP growth
as well as welfare gains, by increasing their public investments in infrastructure
(as a share of GDP) just by small amounts; such as in Bolivia and Chile where
an additional investment of only 2 percent of GDP in infrastructure will result
in growth rates of more than 6 percent. The opposite occurs in Argentina
and Venezuela where a 6% increase will be required to obtain mostly the same
growth rates of 6 and 7% respectively.
By studying the eﬀects of infrastructure policy on consumption, private in-
vestment and wages, I found that public infrastructure investment will be re-
stricted by these variables. Infrastructure investment can adversely aﬀect con-
sumption, private investment and wages due to increased taxation necessary
to fund it. For instance Venezuela’s situation is noteworthy, because it shows
that with a 6 percent increase in public infrastructure investment, consumption
and private investment decrease by 0.75 percent and 0.6 percent respectively.
The latter eﬀect shows that a country’s infrastructure policy must consider the
crowding-out eﬀects that public investment could have on private investment.
This same eﬀect occurs in all countries studied except at much higher infrastruc-
ture investment rates.
This paper also contributes to the literature by using country speciﬁcv a l u e s
for the eﬀectiveness and public capital share parameters, the two key parameters
of this type of models. These calibrated parameters work well with the model
and generate reasonable predictions in terms of infrastructure eﬃciency. For
instance, Bolivia, which is the least eﬃcient country, could increase the impact
of public infrastructure investment by 2 percentage points on its GDP rate
of growth, by attempting to improve its eﬀectiveness index to the levels of
the industrialized countries. This means that the infrastructure policy should
consider also mechanisms to increase the eﬃciency of infrastructure attacking
corruption, bureaucracy, lack of maintenance of existing infrastructure, etc.
Finally from the point of view of IIRSA Initiative, this paper contributes to
it by showing the levels of investment in public infrastructure that each country
should reach (as a share of GDP) in order to maximize its rates of growth and
welfare. Also, it shows that it is very important that the countries improve
their levels of eﬃciency in order to take more advantage of the increases in
public investment.
More research is needed to understand the relation between the infrastruc-
ture eﬀectiveness parameter and the share of public capital in the production
f u n c t i o n .T h i sp a p e rs h o w st h a tt h i sr e l a t i o ni sc o u n t r y - s p e c i ﬁc and thus should
be analyzed in deep, using econometric techniques.
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Appendix
Table A1: Infrastructure Loss Indicators for each Country
Country Year Powera Telecomb Paved Roadsc Waterd Inf. Eﬀec.
Argentina 90/98/02 20 17 41 30
Weighted 8 1.7 10.25 7.5 72.55%
Bolivia 90 16 46 79 30
Weighted 6.4 4.6 19.75 7.5 61.75%
Brazil 02 14 3 31 30
Weighted 5.6 0.3 7.75 7.5 78.85%
Chile 90/02 19 3 58 30
Weighted 7.6 0.3 14.5 7.5 70.10%
Venezuela 90 18 6 60 30
Weighted 7.2 0.6 15 7.5 69.70%
Ind. Countries
Average (1990) 71 3 1 5 8
Weighted-Average 3.5 1.17 4.5 0.88 89.95%
a. System losses (% of total output), 1990.
b. Faults (per 100 mainlines per year), 1990 (Bolivia and Venezuela), 2002 (Ar-
gentina, Brazil and Chile).
c. Percentage of roads not in good conditions, 1990 (Bolivia, Chile and Venzuela),
2002 (Argentina and Brazil)
d. Losses (% of total water provision) 1990 (average of countries)
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